
# An Infrastructure for Faithful Execution of Remote Attestation Protocols

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**Objective**: Design, implement, and prove correct a collection of software components that provide a sound infrastructure for remote attestation of layered systems.



### **Attestation Manager Monad + Appraisal Term Synthesis** AM Monad Environment

- Nonce generation
  - Composing evidence from multiple Copland phrase runs
- Appraisal Configuration
- Golden measurement values
- Public keys
- Mapping from measurement to appraisal routines
- Appraisal Term Synthesis
- Attestation phrase + Evidence → Appraisal phrase
- Leverages existing Copland Compiler + AVM
  - Less error-prone than manually constructing appraisal routines per-protocol

## **Formal Verification**

- Evidence Semantics (Completed)
  - Shape of AVM-produced evidence respects Copland ref. semantics
- System Event Correspondence (Nearly Complete)
  - AVM respects event orderings of Copland reference semantics
- Appraisal Completeness and Soundness (Ongoing)
  - Every part of the evidence is appraised
  - What does a successful appraisal say about the target platform (and its configuration)?

[1] J. D. Ramsdell, P. D. Rowe, P. Alexander, S. C. Helble, P. Loscocco, A. J. Pendergrass, and A. Petz. "Orchestrating Layered Attestations". POST 2019, 2019.

[2] A. Petz and P. Alexander. "A Copland Attestation Manager". HotSoS 2019, 2019.

[3] P. D. Rowe. "Confining adversary actions via measurement". Third International Workshop on Graphical Models for Security, pages 150–166, 2016.

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- let t =  $@_{42}$  (ASP 1  $\bar{a} p r \rightarrow SIG$ )
- $n \leftarrow generate_nonce$  $e \leftarrow run_avm(t, n)$
- appraise(t, e)
- if b then ''appraisal\_success'' else ''appraisal\_failure'